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Note
Will the Commerce Clause "Pull the Plug" on
Minnesota's Quantification of the Environmental
Externalities of Electricity Production?
Margaret Tortorella
Electrical power plants cause environmental damage that
may total tens of millions of dollars each year.1 Yet, the market
price of electricity does not directly take into account the environmental consequences of electricity generation, such as air
pollution. 2 As a result, society bears these unaccounted-for costs
in the form of increased health care expenses, depleted agricultural resources', and a reduced quality of life.3 Environmentalists have termed such unaccounted-for costs "environmental
externalities."4
Some types of electric power generation produce more environmental externalities than others. Deriving energy from fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and natural gas, contributes heavily to
pollution. 5 In contrast, using renewable resources, including so1.

See, e.g., Scott Allen, Polluting Power Plants to Pay Price, BOSTON

GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1992, at 29 (noting that yearly environmental costs of a pro-

posed Massachusetts coal-burning power plant were estimated at nearly $50
million).
2. Id. (reporting that, as of 1992, only Massachusetts and New York consider cost of pollution in determining economic feasibility of new power plants).
3. Id. (noting that Massachusetts public utilities officials considered such
unaccounted-for costs in changing plant approval policies).
4. Sherry A. Quirk et al., Report of the Committee on Electric Utility Regulation, 14 ENERGY L.J. 447, 478 (1993) (defining environmental externalities in
the public utility context).
5. James P. Karp, Sustainable Development: Toward a New Vision, 13
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 239,247 (1994) (citing BARRY CoMMoNER, MAIUNG PEACE WrrH
THE PLANET 10 (1990)). All fossil fuel plants produce large amounts of certain
pollutants, including carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, VOCs, and, for coal-fired
plants, sulfur dioxide. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice
Between Markets and Central Planningin Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1339, 1389 (1993). Coal-fired plants cause approximately two-thirds of the nationwide sulfur dioxide emissions. Id. Fossil fuel
use produces nearly six billion tons of carbon emissions each year. Christopher

1547

1548

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1547

lar,6 wind, 7 biomass, 8 hydro,9 and geothermal' 0 energy, affects
the external environment significantly less. l " Currently, the
United States electricity industry relies predominantly on coalfired generation. 1 2 Renewable resources, which are new participants in the energy market, cost more than fossil fuels and operate on a smaller scale. 13 Nevertheless, cultivating renewable
Flavin & Nicholas Lenssen, Beyond the FossilAge, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15,
1991, at 20, 20.
6. Solar collectors convert the sun's rays directly into electricity, as do
photovoltaic or solar cells. Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 5, at 21. Solar energy
has "tremendous potential" as an alternative to fossil fuels because it is renewable, available domestically, widely dispersed throughout the country, and generally environmentally benign. THoMAs A. STARRS, Solar, Wind, and
GeothermalEnergy, in SUSTAINABLE ENvmoNmENTAL LAw: INTEGRATING NATURAL RESOURCE AND POLLUTION ABATEMENT LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY

735, 766 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
7. Power plants create wind power by using turbines to convert the kinetic energy of wind into mechanical energy. Because wind is created by uneven heating of the earth's atmosphere by the sun, wind power is actully a kind
of solar energy. STARs, supra note 6, at 772.
8. Biomass is solar energy that the chlorophyll molecules of green plants
store. Jane H. Turnbull, Pigs, Peas,and... Power? FarmersSoon May Grow a
Renewable Energy Source, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1, 1993, at 26, 27.
One environmental benefit of biomass is its potential to diminish total
emissions of carbon dioxide in the United States. Id. at 30. In addition, the
residual ash remaining after the combustion of biomass is made of nutrients
required for plant growth that farmers can add to soil. Id. at 31.
9. Hydrogen is the cleanest burning fuel and power plants may burn it in
place of petroleum, coal, and natural gas. Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 5, at
22.
10. Geothermal energy is the "natural heat in the earth's crust." STARRS,
supra note 6, at 783. Decaying radioactive elements in rock, generate large
amounts of energy and extreme heat. Id. Geothermal energy is usable in three
forms: hydrothermal energy (steam or liquid trapped in rock layers that can be
tapped with wells), geopressured energy (reservoirs of pressurized hot brine),
and hot dry rock (solid rock into which water is injected, heated, and returned
to the surface). Id. Geothermal energy is "not as environmentally benign as
solar or wind energy," but is less polluting than fossil fuels. Id. at 784.
11. Michael C. Brower et al., A Mixed Bag, PUB. UTiL. FORT., May 1, 1994,
at 33.
12. In 1990, nearly 56% of all energy generated in the United States came
from coal-fired plants; 21% came from nuclear energy; 14% came from petroleum and natural gas; and the remaining 9% came from hydro, geothermal, and
other sources. Donald A. Crane et al., Coal and EmergingEnergy and Environmental Policy, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1991, at 26, 26. Approximately
1170 coal-fired electric utility steam units operate in the United States, issuing
a combined generation capacity of 310,000 megawatts of power. Id. at 27.
Forty-eight percent of those coal-fired boilers were installed before the federal
government began to regulate emissions on new plants. Id.
13. Estimates suggest that the capital cost of renewable energy technologies amounts to three times the capital cost of refurbishing existing coal-fired
plants. Eugene M. Trisko, Environmental Externalities: Thinking Globally,
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sources of energy is crucial to the reliability of14America's energy
supply and to slowing global climate change.
Recently, lawmakers have recognized that regulation can
force utilities to incorporate environmental externalities into the
price of power, thereby "internalizing" the environmental costs
of power plants. 15 Several states have enacted regulations seeking to neutralize the price advantage fossil fuel plants currently
hold over renewable resource plants by adding to the direct price
of electricity a value that reflects the amount of damage the
power plant inflicts on the environment. 16 To this end, regulaTaxing Locally, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1993, at 52, 53-54; cf. Karp, supra
note 5, at 247-48 (positing that the long-term problem with reliance on
nonrenwable resources is not running out of fuel, but expending increasing
amounts of economic wealth to obtain the scarce fuels) But see Michael Brower,
Renewable Energy's Place in the Second Electrical Century, PUB. UTiL. FORT.,
Nov. 8, 1990, at 5, 5 (predicting that with "relatively minor technical improvements and the benefit of mass production," renewable resources could be competitive with fossil-fuel technologies).
14. Cf. Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 5, at 21 (arguing that the alternative
to "energy from the sun and other renewable resources ... is to risk a future of
economic and ecological decline").
15. Economic theory provides insight into the need for governmental regulation of externalities. A society "optimally allocates" resources when that society would lose more by taking a unit of resource away from one use than it
would gain by devoting the resource to another use. WILFRED BECKERMAN,
PRICING FOR POLLUTION 24, 25 (2d ed. 1990). An unregulated market will not
always achieve optimal allocation because the social costs of making a product
may exceed its value to society, as reflected in its price. Id. at 25-26. When
economic activity affects the external environment, the market mechanism fails
to reach the social optimum because society, rather than the economic actor,
bears the cost of production. Id. at 27-28.
Policy and regulatory intervention can influence power plants' internalization of environmental externalities in three ways. First, regulation and policy
can determine what technologies utilities may use in producing energy, excluding plants with below par technologies. RoBIN CANTOR ET AL., OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, BEYOND THE MARKET: RECENT REGULATORY RESPONSES TO
THE EXTERNALITIES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 6 (1991) (manuscript prepared for

the U.S. Dep't of Energy under contract no. DE-AC05-850-850R21400). Second, regulation can use emissions-specific controls to impact the mix of resources utilities choose to meet their energy needs. Id. Third, regulation and
policy may impose taxes or subsidies on energy services to reflect externalities.
Id. Only the tax and subsidy option "can be said to have a direct influence on
market price and output levels for the energy service." Id.
16. Seventeen states currently take environmental externalities into account in the resource planning process. Eight states attempt to "quantify" environmental externalities. These states include: California, Re Biennial
Resource Plan Update Following the Cal. Energy Comm'n's Seventh Elec. Report, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 181, 188-89, 194-96 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Conm'n 1991); Minnesota, Re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 130, 137-39 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994); Nevada, Re
Rulemaking Regarding Resource Planning Changes Pursuant to SB 497, 119
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tors quantify the environmental externalities by placing a monetary value on each ton of a pollutant. 17 When a utility adds
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 257, 266-68 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1991); New
York, Re Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 101 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 280,
299-301 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989); Oregon, Re Guidelines for the Treatment of External Envtl. Costs, 142 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 465, 468-73 (Or.
Pub. Util. Comm'n. 1993); Texas, P.U.C. Subst. R.23.31(h)(4)(B)(ii); Vermont,
Re Least-Cost Investments, Energy Efficiency, Conservation, and Management
of Demand for Energy, 111 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 427, 432-35 (Vt. Pub.
Serv. Bd. 1990); and Wisconsin, Re Advance Plans for Construction of Facilities, 136 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 153, 195-96 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992).
Two states endorse quantification in concept but have not set numerical
values for external costs. See Re Arkansas Power & Light Co., 136 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 59, 65 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992); Re A Proceeding to Require Energy Utilities to Implement Integrated Resource Planning, 131 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 535, 545-46 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1992).
Seven states consider environmental externalities as a factor in energy
plan decisions, but in a qualitative rather than a quantitative manner. These
states include: Colorado, Re Integrated Resource Planning, 139 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 379, 383 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1992); Connecticut, Re External
Costs and Benefits Associated With Energy Consumption, No. 92-09-029, 1993
WL 655224, at *2-*3 (Conn. Dep't Pub. Util. Control 1993); Idaho, Re Washington Water Power Co., 135 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 382, 399 (Idaho Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1992); Illinois, Re Rulemaking to Implement Recommendation of 5 of
the Order in 91-0050 Adopting a Comprehensive Electric Energy Plan, No. 920274, 1994 WL 736321, at *1 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1994); Montana, Re Montana Power Co., 152 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 403, 403, 416-419 (Mont. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1994); Utah, Re PacifiCorp, 135 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306,
309-311 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992); and Virginia, Re Conservation and
Load Management Programs, 131 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 524, 530 (Va. State
Corp. Comm'n 1992).
Some states have expressly rejected quantification. See, e.g., Re Florida
Power & Light Co., 156 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 333, 342 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1994).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court recently invalidated that state's environmental externality policy, finding that the Massachusetts Department of
Public Utilities exceeded its authority by requiring consideration of environmental externality values that did not affect utility costs or consumer rates.
Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1033
(Mass. 1994). Against a challenge by certain environmental groups, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Public Utilities Commission need not consider environmental externalities in its determination of whether to approve a
coal-fired power plant project in Alaska. Alaska Fed'n for Community Self-Reliance v. Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n, 879 P.2d 1015, 1022 (Alaska 1994).
17. State public utilities commissions can determine the value of an environmental externality in two ways. One method calculates the environmental
damage of a pollutant by examining the "real world costs of future climate
change, illness, and crop damage." Ross Gelbspan, Utilities Target Antipollution Plan: Critics Fear That Companies' Effort Will Weaken State Emissions
Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1992, at 33, 38. This "damage-cost estimate"
considers all of the environmental effects of the pollutant, ranging from local

health problems to the future impact of global warming.

KENNETH ROSE ET AL.,

THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PUBLIC UTLIy COMMISSION
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these externality values to the price of electrical power generation, renewable resource power usually seems much cheaper
than fossil fuel power.1 8 The utility, bound to choose the "leastcost" mix of resources, 19 will choose "cleaner" renewable resource energy over "dirtier" fossil fuel energy to satisfy its future
electricity needs. The regulations thus purport to simultaneously discourage polluters and give nonpolluters a competitive
boost. 20
TREATMENT OF
TREATMENT OF

ENVIRONm miEA ExrrmAtrrms 2 (1994) [hereinafter PUC
ENVmoNmENTAL ExTNAsrrIS]. While the damage-cost

method seems the more logical, public utilities commissions cannot determine
speculative quantified damage estimates. Id. at 2-3.
Public utilities commissions generally use the second method, basing externality values on the costs to power plants of installing technologies that control
air emissions. Id. at 3. Public utilities commissions can quantify such costs
with "relative precision." Gelbspan, supra, at 38. Critics call this "control cost
method" arbitrary because the cost of emission-reducing equipment bears no
relation to the environmental costs that the externality values purport to quantify. PUC TREATMENT OF ENvmoNMENTAL EXTERNALrriEs, supra, at 3.
18. With the added pollution value, less environmentally damaging energy
technologies, such as solar, wind, and biomass, appear cheaper than fossil fuels.
Trisko, supra note 13, at 53. Quantified externality values can therefore "effectively eliminate[ ] coal as a resource option" when compared to renewables or
even to natural gas. Black & Pierce, supra note 5, at 1400 (demonstrating that
using Massachusetts's carbon dioxide externality value would have added a
price to coal more than double the price it would have added to natural gas
power).
19. States consider environmental externalities in the context of "integrated resource planning." In an integrated resource plan, utilities create a
strategy to satisfy future electricity demand at the lowest possible cost and
maximum benefit to consumers. Clinton A. Vince et al., IntegratedResource
Planning:The Case for Exporting ComprehensiveEnergy Planningto the Developing World, 25 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 371, 373 (1993); see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 2602(19) (Supp. IV 1992) (defining integrated resource planning). In practice,
a utility creates a plan for building or buying power from new power plants, or
instituting energy conservation programs, to meet projected energy needs. The
utility then submits its plan to the state public utilities commission for approval. As of 1994, 43 state utility commissions had complied with the Energy
Policy Act's mandate to consider implementing integrated resource planning.
Herbert A. Cavanaugh, The IRP Puzzle: Do the Pieces Fitin a Competitive Environment?, ELECTRICAL WORLM, Sept. 1994, at 23, 26.

20. Players in the coal industry argue that quantification of environmental
externalities unfairly penalizes them in the power generation market. See, e.g.,
ColoradoPUC Rejects ExternalitiesMandate in UtilityLeast-Cost Plans,ELECTRiC UTiL. Wy,, Jan. 25, 1993, at 11 (stating that "coal producers and utilities
with heavy coal-fired generation have fought the use of environmental externalities, arguing that they amount to nothing more than an unfair, unjustified tax
on coal"); Mass. DPU Upholds Externality Values, Despite Cautions Over Fuel
Diversity, ELECTRIC UTIL. Wk-, Dec. 7, 1992, at 13 (noting coal producers' argument that states quantifying environmental externalities "effectively outlaw"
coal-fired plants and other pollutant-emitting fossil fuel plants).
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Although this scheme furthers important state environmental goals, it simultaneously burdens out-of-state participants in
the interstate electricity market. In 1993, Minnesota enacted
legislation requiring the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
to quantify a range of environmental costs associated with methods of energy generation. 2 1 This Note will use the Minnesota
statute to examine the viability and constitutionality of state
regulations quantifying the environmental externalities of
power production. Part I reviews the efforts of Minnesota and
the federal government to decrease power plant pollution and
spur the development of renewable resources, tracing the instate and out-of-state effects of Minnesota's environmental externality law. Part II surveys Commerce Clause principles, and
Part III analyzes whether Minnesota's quantification of environmental externalities violates the Commerce Clause. Part IV
proposes that Minnesota quantify only in-state environmental
harms as a short-term measure to avoid imposing on interstate
trade. Part IV also proposes a market-based environmental
scheme that obviates the need for state quantification. This
Note concludes that expanding research grants and economic incentives, as well as coordinating federal and state market-based
regulation, will solve the problem of environmental externalities
by serving states' environmental objectives in a manner consistent with the Commerce Clause.
I. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND SPUR
DEVELOPMENT OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES
A.

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENERGY-RELATED LEGISLATION

Over the past two decades, federal and state governments
have enacted legislation that aims to reduce power plant pollution and encourage the development of renewable resource technologies. Pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act,2 2 for example,
the Environmental Protection Agency has set national ambient
air quality standards for sulfur dioxide, particulates, carbon
monoxide, ozone, nitrogen oxide, and lead. 23 The Clean Air Act
21. See Act of May 24, 1993, 1993 Mimi. Laws ch. 356, § 3 (codified as
amended at MmN. STAT. § 216B.2422 (1994)).
22. Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C §§ 7401-7671q (Supp. V 1993)).
23. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1994) (sulfur dioxide); id. § 50.6 (particulate matter); id. § 50.8 (carbon monoxide); id. § 50.9 (ozone); id. § 50.11 (nitrogen oxide);
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requires every state to formulate a plan for achieving these standards. 24 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 2 5 ("CAAA7),
which Congress enacted to reduce the pollutants leading to acid
rain2 6 that are "a direct result of burning fossil fuels," 27 places a
cap on emissions rates for nitrogen oxides. 28 This cap only applies to coal-fired units. 29 The CAAA also features a marketable
permits system in which electric utilities can buy and sell "allowances" to emit sulfur dioxide, subject to an annual limit. 30
Despite current pollution controls, however, scientific evidence
demonstrates that environmental damages persist.3 1
While strengthening its attempts to reduce power plant
emissions, the federal government has also gradually increased
id. § 50.12 (lead). The EPA enacted these standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7408, 7409 (1988).

24. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1988).

25. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
26. See Alexander F. Skirpan, Jr., Plus Qa Change, Plus C'est La Mdme
Chose: 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act and Their Impact on Utility Regulation, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 171, 171 & n.2 (1993); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcTION AGENCY, Acr DEPOSrrION STANDARD FEASIBILITY STUDy REPORT TO
CONGRESS xiii (1995) (explaining expected benefits of the CAAA, including decreasing acidity of lakes and streams, improving fish population, decreasing soil
degradation and forest stress, improving visibility, decreasing harm to cultural
resources, and reducing adverse human health effects from atmospheric deposition of sulfur and nitrogen compounds).

27. Bob von Sternberg, Battle AgainstAcid Rain Seems to be Closer to Victory, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 16, 1992, at 21A.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7651f (Supp. V 1993); see also Skirpan, supra note 26, at
181-82 (discussing nitrogen oxide emission requirements of CAAA).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7651f(a). The CAAA has had "far-reaching implications"
for the electricity industry. Thomas R. Kline et al., Energy ResourcesLaw: Up-

date on Environmentaland Health and Safety Regulatory Issues, 28 TORT &
INS. L.J. 211, 221 (1993); Skirpan, supra note 26, at 172 ("The costs to be born
by utility companies, and eventually their customers, to reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions and to comply with the CAAA are anticipated to be staggering for
utilities that own fossil fuel electric generating units.").
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b; see also Skirpan, supra note 26, at 173-81 (discussing two phases of CAAA sulphur dioxide reduction scheme); infra text accompanying notes 183-186 (describing CAAA marketable permit system in detail).
31. See MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
COSTS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 1 (1994), reprintedin Re Quantification of Environmental Costs Pursuant to Laws of Minnesota 1993, cl. 356, § 3, No. E-999/
CI-93-583, 1994 WL 614147 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994) (testimony of
Gregory Pratt, Ph.D.). Existing Clean Air Act national ambient air quality
standards do not prevent all environmental damages because such standards
cover "only a handful of the thousands of known air pollutants" and because the
standards may not adequately protect the public from long-term exposure to
sanctioned pollution levels. Id.

1554

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1547

its commitment to renewable resource energy.3 2 In the late
1970s, Congress enacted several statutes authorizing federal
grants to states, businesses, and individuals to research and de-3
3
velop commercial energy systems using renewable resources.
In the 1980s, the viability of these programs led to more legislation outlining specific objectives for incorporating renewable
sources into the United States energy scheme. 3 4 Congress has
continued these trends in the 1990s by expanding grants and
studies,3 5 providing a tax credit for renewables, 3 6 making the
32. See, STvAms, supra note 6, at 767 (describing political developments in
the Middle Eastern countries that led the United States to explore domestically-produced renewable energy alternatives).
33. In 1975, Congress invited state governors to devise State Energy Conservation Plans that may request federal assistance for renewable energy capital investments, projects, and programs. Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 362, 89 Stat. 871, 933-34 (1975) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 6322 (Supp. V 1993)). In 1977 Congress established a small grant
program for the research and development of energy systems using renewable
resources. Act of June 3, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-39, § 112, 91 Stat. 180, 186
(1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5907a (1988)). Pursuant to its recognition that
the United States "is faced with a finite and diminishing resource base of fossil
fuels" and declared policy of developing "diversified" energy capabilities, Congress in 1978 authorized federal assistance for public or private entities interested in purchasing and installing solar photovoltaic technology. Solar
Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-590, 92 Stat. 2513 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5581-89
(1988)).
34. Congress enacted the Renewable Energy Resource Act of 1980 to establish incentives for renewable energy use, and to promote public awareness of
renewable resources and energy conservation. Pub. L. No. 96-294, §§ 401-09, 94
Stat. 715-19 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7371-75 (1988)). The Renewable
Energy Resource Act further authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Energy to establish a pilot program to demonstrate that renewable resources could
provide the "energy self-sufficiency" that would reduce United States reliance
on imported fossil fuels. 42 U.S.C. § 7374. Also in 1980, Congress enacted the
Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Research, Development and Demonstration Act. Pub. L. No. 96-310, 94 Stat. 941 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 900109 (1988)). The Act establishes a goal that by the mid-1990s, ocean thermal
energy should be competitive with conventional energy sources, and that by
1999, 10,000 megawatts of electricity should come from ocean thermal energy
conversion systems. 42 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(4).
35. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 included a provision to allow the Department of Energy (DOE) to bestow Renewable Energy Advancement Awards on
significant contributors to renewable energy applications. Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§ 1204, 106 Stat. 2776, 2961-61 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13313 (Supp. V
1993)). The act further permits the DOE to distribute incentive payments to
state-owned renewable energy facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 13317.
36. The Federal Energy Tax Act provides an investment tax credit for energy equipment using solar or geothermal energy to produce electricity. 26
U.S.C. § 48 (Supp. V 1993). The Act also provides a renewable energy production credit of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour for wind and biomass plants. 26
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use of renewables a national energy priority, 7 and setting the
goal of increasing energy generated from renewable resources by
seventy-five percent over 1988 levels by the year 2005.38 Congress considered, but did not pass, language in the Energy Policy Act of 199239 that would require utilities to consider the
environmental impacts of electricity sources in their future
40
planning process.
B.

MINNESOTA'S RENEWABLE RESOURCE ENERGY LEGISLATION

Every region in Minnesota generally complies with federal
air quality standards. 4 ' In 1982, concerned about acid rain
damage to Minnesota's northern lakes, Minnesota passed the
Acid Deposition Control Act, 42 which limits acid rain levels and
sets emissions standards for the Minnesota power plants that
contribute most to acid rain.43 The Minnesota utilities met
U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1993); see infra notes 172-176 and accompanying text (advocating expansion of federal production and investment tax credits).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 13382 (Supp. V 1993). Congress required the Secretary of
Energy to submit a National Energy Policy Plan containing policies with a
strategy for generating energy at the lowest cost and prioritizing the use of solar, geothermal, biomass, hydropower, and wind power. Id.
38. Id. § 13382(a)(4). Congress has also authorized the Secretary to conduct a five-year program analyzing cost-effective options for meeting the stated
goal. Id. § 13471(a).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. IV 1992).
40. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15, 172-73
(1992) (report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce proposing
amendment to H.R. 776 that would require utilities to consider environmental
costs in their resource planning decisions).
41. Re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 130, 137 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994). Each of the six regions in
Minnesota meets the ozone and nitrogen dioxide standards. Id. at 141 n.8. Two
regions do not meet national carbon monoxide standards. MINNESOTA PoLLuTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA CARBON MONOXIDE NONATT mE
AREAS
1 (1993) (map). The Environmental Protection Agency currently lists two Minnesotan regions as nonattainment areas for particulates, MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA PM10 NONATTAIMENT AREAS 1 (1993)
(map), and two regions as nonattainment areas for sulfur dioxide, MINNESOTA
POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA SULFUR DIOXIDE NONATTAINMENT AREAS 1 (1993) (map), but the Environmental Protection Agency is reviewing
these listings. Interview With Susan Mitchell, Air Quality Division, Minnesota
Pollution Control Ageny, St. Paul, MN (Mar. 31, 1995). The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency projects the redesignation of one of the particulate nonattainment areas by the summer of 1995.
42. MINN. STAT. §§ 116.42-.45 (1994).
43. von Sternberg, supra note 27, at 21A; see MINN. R. 7021.00107021.0030 (1993) (setting a standard of 11 kilograms per hectare for sulfate
deposition in acid-sensitive regions of Minnesota). In 1986, Minnesota adopted
a three-part control plan to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, Am QUALrY DiviSION, FACT SHEET ON PROPOSED ISSU-
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these requirements, and sulfur emissions have been greatly reduced. 44 The law, however "was nearly toothless" because it
had no jurisdiction over emissions from power plants in Texas,
North Dakota, and the Lower Mississippi Valley that cause as
much as ninety percent of Minnesota's acid rain.45
Further, in keeping with its statutory responsibility to "use
all practicable means" to "minimize the environmental impact
from energy production and use,"4 6 the Minnesota Legislature
has declared a "vital interest in... the development and use of
renewable energy resources" 47 and has enacted several statutes
encouraging such renewable resource development. Some statutes authorize research projects. 48 One statute requires Minnesota public utilities to spend between one-half and two percent
of their gross in-state operating revenues on "energy conservaANCE OF AN AIR EMISSION PERMIT FOR THE NORTHERN STATES POWER ALLEN S.

KING PLANT 4 (1993) [hereinafter MPCA FACT SHEET]. The plan required two
Minnesota coal-fired plants with the highest sulfur emissions to install certain
pollution control technology. Id. In addition, it capped system-wide sulfur dioxide emissions from two Minnesota utilities and set a statewide sulfur dioxide
limit of 224,000 tons per year in 1990 and 194,000 tons per year in 1994. Id. at
4,5.
44. MPCA FACT SHEET, supra note 43, at 5. Sulfur dioxide emissions in
Minnesota totalled 131,545 tons in 1988, 121,436 tons in 1990, and approximately 105,000 tons in 1991. Id.
45. von Sternberg, supra note 27, at 21A. Because "sulfur dioxide is readily transported hundreds of miles," neither Minnesota nor any other single
state causes more than 10% of the sulfate deposits in the acid-sensitive regions
of Minnesota. MPCA FACT SHEET, supra note 43, at 5.
46. MwN. STAT. § 116D.02(2)(i) (1994).
47. MmiN. STAT. § 2160.05 (1994). The Legislature also stated that "it is in
the public interest to review, analyze and encourage those energy programs
that will minimize the need for annual increases in fossil fuel consumption by
1990." Id. Energy policy and planning will facilitate Minnesota's "transition
from historic growth in energy demand to a period when demand for traditional
fuels becomes stable and the supply of renewable energy resources is readily
available and adequately utilized." Id.
48. See MwN'. STAT. § 216B.241(2) (providing that Minnesota Public Utlities Commissioner must designate a utility to establish a pilot program for developing energy from renewable resources); id. § 2160.10(6), (7) (1994)
(allowing the Minnesota Public Utilities Commissioner to perform market analysis studies pertaining to renewable energy resources and to assist persons who
are preparing proposals for renewable energy projects). Several wind monitoring projects currently exist within Minnesota. In re Northern States Power Co.,
155 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 106, 117 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994). The
Minnesota Department of Public Service controls the Wind Resource Assessment Project (WRAP) and the Utility Renewable Resource Pilot Program
(URRPP). Id. With respect to biomass, Northern States Power (NSP) is running a "sustainable alfalfa biomass gasification study," and Minnesota Power is
conducting a "whole tree feasibility study." Id. at 118.
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tion improvements," 4 9 which include renewable resource technologies. 50 Another statute exempts certain wind and
photovoltaic energy systems from property taxes. 5 '
In 1991, Minnesota enacted legislation favoring renewable
energy in the construction of new power plants. 52 The law prohibits new nonrenewable energy plants unless the applicant
demonstrates that it has researched reuewable energy alternafives and that its proposed plant "is less expensive (including
environmental costs) than power generated by a renewable energy source."5 3 In 1993, Minnesota strengthened its statutory
preference for renewable resources, providing that the Public
Utilities Commission "shall not approve a new or refurbished
nonrenewable energy facility... unless the utility has demonstrated that a renewable energy facility is not in the public interest."5 4 This is a high-albeit not insurmountable-standard
for fossil fuel plant applicants to meet. 5 5
49. MwN. STAT. § 216B.241(1)(a). A utility that furnishes gas services must
invest 0.5%, a utility providing electric service must invest 1.5%, and a utility
that both provides electricity and operates a nuclear power plant must invest
two percent. Id.
50. The term "energy conservation improvement" covers both conservation
devices, like energy-efficient lighting, id. § 216B.241(1)(d)(5), and any "device or
method that creates, converts, or actively uses energy from renewable resources
such as solar, wind, and biomass." Id. § 216B.241(1)(d)(7).
51. Id. § 272.02(21)(23) (1994).
52. Id. § 216B.243(3)(a) (1994).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 216B.2422(4) (1994). Connecticut, New Jersey, Colorado, California, and Arizona also use renewable resource preference policies in their integrated resource planning processes. See Quirk et al., supra note 4, at 481-82.
55. The Public Utilities Commission recently approved a gas-fired cogeneration power plant project. LS Power (LSP-CG), a Montana company, proposed
building a natural-gas plant in Cottage Grove, Minnesota, to supply NSP with
electricity and to replace the coal-fired steam generation boilers of a nearby 3M
Company plant. Susan E. Peterson, NSP Will Buy Electricity From PlantLS
Power Will Build in Cottage Grove; 30-Year Agreement Is Reached After Project
Gets Boost from Legislature, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis), May 21, 1994, at ID.
The project will be NSP's first cogeneration project, offering the environmental
advantage of using recycled cooling water from 3M to generate heat, which
reduces emissions that would result from independently generating electricity.
Id. The Minnesota Legislature enabled LSP-CG to bid competitively for the
project by exempting it from more than $5 million in personal property taxes.

Id.
In Re LSP-Cottage Grove, LP, No. IP-1/CN-94-004, 1994 WL 614024
(Minn. Pub. Util. Cornm'n Oct. 19, 1994), the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission upheld an administrative law judge's conclusion that LSP-CG's proposed natural-gas fired cogeneration project would meet NSP's electricity needs
through an efficient use of resources, and that other proposals were more expensive and would not provide equivalent socioeconomic or environmental benefits. Id. at *3-*4. The administrative law judge had found that LSP-CG's
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The most recent additions to Minnesota's renewable energy
scheme are mandatory wind and biomass power quotas, which
became effective on May 11, 1994, for utilities operating nuclearpowered electricity plants. 5 6 These renewable power mandates
were part of a political compromise whereby the Legislature allowed Northern States Power Co. ("NSP")5 7 to store additional
nuclear waste casks at its Prairie Island nuclear power plant in
Minnesota in exchange for wind and biomass commitments. 58
The wind-power statute also requires the utility to construct or
purchase a specified amount of wind-powered electricity by the
year 2002, if wind is the least-costly alternative. 59 These wind
and biomass quotas may displace nuclear power in Minnesota
and position the state as a "major player in the area of renewa-

proposal would result in a net reduction of emissions, and that although wind
or solar power produced lower emissions, they could not displace 3M's existing
plant and were not suitable for intermediate load electrical generation. Id. at
*4.
56. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.2423 (1994) (requiring utilities that operate
nuclear power plants to construct or purchase 225 megawatts of "electric energy
installed capacity generated by wind energy conversion systems" by 1998 and
an additional 200 megawatts of installed capacity by 2002); id. § 216B.2424
(mandating that such utilities construct or purchase, by 1998, 50 megawatts of
electric energy installed capacity generated from biomass and 75 more megawatts by 2002).
57. NSP supplies electrical and gas services in Michigan, Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Money Notes, TAMPA TRm., Dec. 10,
1994, at 9. It generates 75% of its power from coal and nuclear energy. Id.
58. See MIN. STAT. § 116C.771 (1994); see also Diane Jensen, PrairieIsland and Our Energy Future, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Apr. 26, 1994, at 13A
(describing controversy over NSP's need for the nuclear waste storage and hailing House compromise bill); Judy M. Poferl, Opponents of PrairieIslandProject
Failing to Tell Whole Story, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Apr. 29, 1994, at 24A
(countering opponents of dry-cask storage with data demonstrating that closing
Prairie Island would unnecessarily raise energy costs).
59. MIN. STAT. § 216B.2423(2) (Supp. 1995). This mandate is contingent
upon resource planning and least cost planning requirements. Id.; see supra
note 19, infra note 63 and accompanying text (describing integrated resource
planning process).
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ble energy"60 along with other Midwestern states capable of sus61
taining new wind projects.
C.

MNNESOTA'S QUANTIFICATION OF ENVmoI
EXTERNALUTIES

MENTAL

Quantifying environmental externalities and requiring utilities to add these values to the direct cost of generating electricity represents another form of pollution disincentive and
renewable energy preference. 62 In 1993, Minnesota passed its
60. Steve Novak, State's Poised to Reap Renewable-Energy Benefits, STAR
TaR. (Minneapolis), Mar. 4, 1995, at 17A. Residents of Minnesota counties
have complained because, while wind machines cost approximately $330,000
each, the Minnesota law formulated to spur wind energy investments exempts
them from property tax See supra text accompanying note 51 (describing Minnesota's property tax exemption for renewable resources); Tom Meersman,
Hear the Wind Blow: Sounds Like Energy, Money Being Made, STAR Tm. (Minneapolis), May 31, 1994, at IA [hereinafter Meersman, Hear the Wind Blow];
see also Tom Meersman, NSP Reaps Wind Crop; Counties Want Cut; Officials
Say Land Should Be Taxed, STAR TaRm. (Minneapolis), Jan. 25, 1995, at B1 (reporting political debate over whether Minnesota Legislature should partially
reinstate property taxes for wind farms). Generally, however, farmers, developers, attorneys, and members of the wind-energy industry hope to profit from
NSP's regulatory mandates. Meersman, Hear the Wind Blow, supra, at IA
(describing NSP's existing 25-megawatt wind farm in Lake Benton, Minnesota,
and commenting that "[w~hile wind may never be a major source of energy in
Minnesota, the prospect of more than 1,000 wind machines and projects worth
an estimated $400 million" has attracted entrepreneurs); John Bailey, Minnesota FarmersMust Quickly LearnNew Math of Wind Power, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Aug. 7, 1994, at 26A (expressing concern that farmers who grant
"perpetual easements" in wind over their land will lose wind rights without receiving fair value for their property). The utilities will also profit from wind
ventures. A typical 330-kilowat turbine will generate approximately $40,000
per year in gross operating revenue if the utility pays the wind company five
cents per kilowatt hour, and $32,000 per year if the utility pays four cents per
kilowatt hour. Id.
61. The most likely location for the new wind capacity is the Buffalo Ridge,
a 10 mile wide stretch of land that runs 60 miles from northwestern Iowa
through Minnesota and into South Dakota. Meersman, Hear the Wind Blow,
supra note 60, at 1& Other areas in the Dakotas that have more wind than
Buffalo Ridge are also likely prospects. Id. NSP is currently conducting a joint
project with other North Dakota utilities to assess the wind resources in North
Dakota. Re Northern States Power Co., 155 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 106, 117
(Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994).
62. States quantifying environmental externalities have used three methods: "monetization," "percentage adders," and "points/ranking systems." "Monetization," the most direct route and the one adopted by Minnesota, involves
assigning dollar values to specific amounts of emissions, such as one dollar per
ton of pollutant emitted. PUC TRFATMENT OF ENvirmONNTAL EXTERNAITIES,
supra note 17, at 2. Public utilities commissions then require utilities to add
these monetized values to the market price of using a particular energy source.
Id.
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environmental externalities law, which directed the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission to "quantify and establish a range
of environmental costs associated with each method of electricity generation." 63 The law further orders public utilities to use
these quantified values "in conjunction with other external factors, including socioeconomic costs," when they evaluate and select resource options in future resource planning and certificate
64
of need proceedings.
Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission set interim monetary values for five air
emissions on March 1, 1994.65 It chose sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, volatile organic compounds, and particulates because
they are "regional pollutants," meaning that they "generally...
affect the environment at or near their source." 6 6 It also chose
carbon dioxide because it is a "greenhouse gas" that is "thought
to contribute to global climate change." 67 In determining the
States that use "percentage adders" add a percentage representing pollution harm to the direct cost of building new power plants and/or subtract a percentage from the direct cost of conservation programs. Id. at 2.
In a "points/ranking system," public utilities commissions translate monetized values for the cost of mitigating pollution into points and use the points to
rank different resource plants that bid competitively for utility power contracts.

Id.
63. MINN. STAT. § 216B.2422(3)(a). A resource plan is a hearing at which a
public utilities commission examines a utility's planned set of options for satisfying its customers' future electricity demands. The electricity industry commonly refers to this set of options as an "integrated resource plan." See supra
note 19 (describing and defining "integrated resource plan"). Some of these options include building new power plants, buying power from other generators,
and instituting conservation programs. See MmN. STAT. § 216B.2422(1)(d) (listing resource options for Minnesota utilities).
64.
mNN. STAT. § 216B.2422(3)(a).
65. Re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 130, 137 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994). The Commission set the following range of interim values: sulfur dioxide (SO2), $0 to $300 per ton; nitrogen oxides (NOx), $68.80 to $1640 per ton; volatile organic compounds (VOCs),
$1180 to $1200 per ton; particulates (PM-10), $166.60 to $2380 per ton; and
carbon dioxide (C02), $5.99 to $13.60 per ton. Id. The Commission declined to
value mercury or carbon monoxide. Id. at 136.
66. Id. Sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) is the pollutant leading to acid rain. Id. at 135.
Nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds combine with sunlight and
other chemicals to form ozone. Id. at 135-36. Particulates are tiny airborne
particles that can "adversely affect public health." Id. at 136.
67. Id. at 139. Utilities argued that the Commission should not value carbon dioxide because "the environmental effects of greenhouse gasses are too uncertain to sustain an externality value." Id. at 136. The Commission, however,
justified its valuation of carbon dioxide on the grounds that "the serious national and international concern over carbon dioxide poses a significant risk of
future regulation or fees related to C0 2" and that assigning a positive value to
this pollutant now "recognizes this economic risk" Id. at 137. See Brower et al.,
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monetary values, the Commission looked to the quantified externality values that other jurisdictions had adopted and to a 1990
study of externalities. 68 The Commission noted that its values
were "conservative" because Minnesota generally meets all of
the Clean Air Act air quality standards for the quantified
pollutants. 6 9
Although renewable resource groups support Minnesota's
practice, 70 some commentators have criticized state quantification of environmental externalities. They claim that quantification is underinclusive because it only values certain air
pollutants and that it distorts the energy market.7 1 They further claim that external costs are too speculative to quantify,
qualified to engage
and that public utilities commissions are not
72
in this type of environmental lawmaking.

D. THE

EFFEcTs OF MINESOTA'S ENvmoNmENTAL

EXTERNALITIEs LAw ON THE INTERSTATE ELECTRICITY
MARKET

Quantifying environmental externalities places states such
as Minnesota in a dilemma when utilities acquire their future
energy supply from out-of-state power plants. When such power
plants bid competitively for in-state power contracts, states can
supra note 11, at 34 (stating that pollution "carries a real financial risk for utilities and their customers: the risk that the energy source will be taxed or regulated more heavily in the future").
68. Re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) at 137. Pace University conducted a study of externalities in 1990; see
RicHARD L. OTTINGER ET AL., PACE UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR ENVIRoNMENTAL
LEGAL STUDIEs, ENVIRONMENTAL CosTs OF ELEcTRICITY (1990) (reviewing the

results and methodologies of assigning monetary costs to environmental externalities). For a summary of other externality studies and their differing quantifed values, see Trisko, supra note 13, at 52.
69. Re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) at 137. The Commission found that using these values in the resource
planning process "should facilitate the selection of the lowest cost resources
from a total societal cost perspective as the Legislature intended." Id. at 133.
The Commission clarified that the externality values would only apply to
utilities' selection of new resources, and not to decisions regarding existing facilities. Id. at 139.
70. See, e.g., Externalities:Minn. Bill RequiresPUCto Quantify Externalities, FavoringRenewables, UTIL. ENVTL. REP., May 14, 1993, at 10 (statement of
director of Izaak Walton League's Midwest Energy Efficiency Program that
Minnesota's quantification bill should "mak[e] it possible for Minnesotans to
receive the least costly and most environmentally beneficial energy sources").
71. See infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text (criticizing existing
quantification methods).
72. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (arguing that current methods of quantifying externalities are exceedingly complex and speculative).
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either ignore their geographic location and regulate in-state and
out-of-state bidders equally, or they can recognize that the bidder is from another state. 73 Treating in-state and out-of-state
plants alike is inconsistent with the goal of "making the polluter
pay" because if the emissions cause low in-state harm, then instate utilities have no reason to internalize them. 74 Basing externality regulation on geographical factors, however, unfairly
obstructs commerce when states favor in-state generators at the
expense of out-of-state interests. Conversely, favoring out-ofstate generators would both give out-of-staters a competitive advantage and allow states to "export" pollution so that the out-ofstate environment bears the social costs of power production. 75
These interstate problems have emerged between Minnesota
and North Dakota.
Although no coal is mined in Minnesota, approximately
twenty-two percent of the state's total energy consumption (including transportation and nontransportation energy) came
from coal in 1992.76 Minnesota's coal-fired plants generated
59.1% of the state's electricity, importing coal largely from Montana and Wyoming. 7 7 Minnesota imported an additional 2.4% of
its electricity 78 from coal-fired plants in North Dakota, which
transmit a substantial part of their output across state lines to
73. Black & Pierce, supra note 5, at 1413. California is the only state that
differentiates between bidders on the basis of their location, compelling utilities
to add an environmental externality penalty to the direct cost of out-of-state
coal-produced energy. Crane et al., supra note 12, at 27.
74. Black & Pierce, supra note 5, at 1413.
75. Id. Although exporting pollution to a state that is willing to bear the
environmental burdens to reap the financial rewards may be politically salient,
it appears unjust. Cf Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66
(reproducing World Bank's former chief economist's memorandum arguing that
dirty industries should move to less-developed countries because such countries
have lower demand for a clean environment and could support polluting industries more efficiently).
76. Richard L. Gordon, A Perspective on Coal in MinnesotaEnergy, in EcoNOMIC IMPACTS OF COAL ON THE MINNESOTA ECONOMY 1 (Pennsylvania State
Univ. Dep't of Mineral Economics ed., 1994).
77. Id. The two largest coal-fired plants in the state, Sherburne County
and Clay Boswell, produced 46% of the total electricity in Minnesota and 72% of
the coal-fired energy. Id. Sherburne County, operated by NSP, has three
units, all of which have installed stack-gas scrubbers for sulfur-dioxide removal. Id. Clay Boswell, operated by Minnesota Power, has four units, but
only the newest is equipped with scrubbers. Id.
In 1992, Minnesota received 15,154 thousand tons of coal from: Montana
(7929 thousand tons), Wyoming (7151 thousand tons), Ilinios (63 thousand
tons), and Pennsylvania (11 thousand tons). Id. at 6.
78. See id. at 5.
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Minnesota.7 9 North Dakota's largest power plant supplies electricity to more than one million Minnesotans by burning seven
million tons of lignite coal, and is equipped with scrubbers to
meet the air emissions requirements of the federal CAAA.80
North Dakota has complained that Minnesota's quantification of environmental externalities would adversely affect its
coal businesses and mitigate the positive socioeconomic impacts
of coal use in Minnesota.8 1 A North Dakota senator alleged that
Minnesota and its Public Utilities Commission "are trying to
shut down one of North Dakota's greatest assets: our coal fields
and electric generating plants."8 2 Quantification of environmental externalities, he argued, "simply add[s] extra costs to the
price of electricity by placing an unreasonable value on environmental issues such as nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon
dioxide emissions."83 He claimed that North Dakota had spent
"hundreds of millions of dollars for emission control equipment"
to deliver Minnesotans electricity produced by "environmentally
clean electric generating plants," and that North Dakota is "one
of the four cleanest air states in the United States" despite operating eleven large coal plants.8 4 The North Dakota lignite in-

79. Id. at 2. Thus, about 62% of Minnesota's electricity supply is coal-generated. Id. Nuclear power accounted for 25%of Minnesota's electricity. Id. at 5.
Hydroelectric power supplied 12.4%, while natural gas and oil each supplied
one percent. Id.
80. Letters from Readers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 11, 1992, at 10A
(etter of James. L. Herbert, assistant general manager, power production, Cooperative Power Association, Eden Prairie). Lignite coal has a relatively low
sulphur content, averaging about three-quarters of one percent, compared to
Eastern coal which has a sulphur content of five percent. Id. Subbituminous
coal contains three-tenths of one percent sulphur. Id.
81. Adam Rose et al., MultiplierImpacts of Coal Use in Minnesota, in EcoNOMIC IMPACTS OF COAL ON THE MINNESOTA ECONOMY, supra note 76, at 1. The
study estimates that in 1991, Minnesota consumed $376.9 million in coal,
which stimulated up to $4.9 billion dollars of additional production throughout
the state's economy. Id. Further, the study concluded that while less than 50
people were employed by coal companies in Minnesota, as many as fifty thousand people derived jobs from coal transportation, the generation of electricity
from coal, and the production of other goods and services as a result of coal-fired
electricity in the state. Id.
82. Letters From Readers, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Oct. 16, 1994, at 26A
(letter of Sen. Harvey Tallackson of Grafton, North Dakota).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 26A. "Please," the Senator wrote, "do not get carried away by
extremist and environmentally misguided groups and produce regulations and
laws designed to kill off our coal-fired electric generating plants." Id.
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dustry speculates that Minnesota's externality valuation
"doubles or triples the price on lignite energy."8 5
On the other side of the externality regulation debate, there
are great possibilities for renewable resource growth in the Midwest. "Minnesotans appreciate the low-cost energy provided by
the North Dakota plants," a Minnesota Public Service Commissioner countered, "but they also care very deeply about the environment."8 6 A recent study indicated that renewable resources
could provide a substantial portion of the new power plant ca7
pacity that Midwestern utilities will need by the year 2000.8
The report stated that renewable resources have the potential to
compete with fossil fuels and are compatible with the Midwest's
geophysical make-up.8 8 Such replacement could also provide
Midwestern states with social benefits including increased jobs
and lower health costs. 8 9 The report concluded that by replacing
some of its coal and gas-fired capacity with wind power, Midwestern utilities could reduce emissions with "no loss of reliability or increase in cost."90
85. N.D. Lignite Grant to Help FightMinnesota Rules, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 12, 1994, at 7B (statement of John Dwyer, president of a lignite
industry group in Bismarck). The Lignite Energy Council, a regional trade association of owners and operators of lignite power plants centered in Bismarck,
North Dakota, petitioned the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to rescind
its earlier order establishing the interim externality values. Re Quantification
of Environmental Costs Pursuant to Laws of Minnesota 1993, ch. 356, § 3, No.
E-999/CI-93-583, 1994 WL 614147, at *1 (Minn. Pub. Util. Conm'n 1994). The
Commission rejected the Lignite Council's challenges to the reasonableness and
constitutionality of the order and denied the petition. Id. at *6. The Commission found that its externality values "simply grow out of Minnesota's legitimate interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens and
environment" by ensuring rational resource planning decisions. Id.
86. Letters From Readers, supra note 82 at 28A (statement of Minnesota
Public Service Commissioner in response to North Dakota State Sen. Harvey
Tallackson).
87. See MICHAEL BROWER ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, POWERING THE MIDWEST: RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FOR THE ECONOMY AND THE ENvI-

RONMEN r 10

(1993).

88. Id. In Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South
Dakota, the windiest states, utilities could install wind turbines that would provide electricity for a price comparable to the cost of new coal-fired plants. Id.
Because of the Midwest's agricultural resources, biomass crops could produce at
least 10% of electric demand in every Midwestern state for a relatively competitive price. 1d.
89. Id. at 10-11.
90. Id. at 10. The report found that NSP could replace its proposed 200
megawatts (MW) of coal-fired capacity and 450 MW of gas-fired combined cycle
capacity with 1400 MW of wind power and 315 MW of gas-fired combustion
turbines with "no loss of reliabilityor increase in cost," but with a 13% drop in
emissions of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. Id. Despite
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STATE LAWS AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE

STRICT SCRUTINY, THE COMMERCE CLAusE BALANCING
TEST, AND STATUTES THAT DIRECTLY REGULATE
COMMERCE

The coal industry argues that regulations quantifying environmental externalities violate the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution,91 which declares that Congress
shall have the power to "regulate Commerce... among the several States."9 2 Congressional authority, however, does not preclude states from regulating matters of "local concern" that have
limited effects on interstate commerce, when there is little need
for national uniformity. 9 3 Nevertheless, the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine provides that individuals should be able to participate in a common market without state lines blocking the
free flow of goods.9 4 In other words, the Constitution does not
the potential for renewable resource power, some commentators note that existing fossil-fuel and nuclear plants will probably remain the major contributors
of electricity in the energy industry. Solar and wind power, for example, suffer
from variability. Brower, supra note 13, at 5; Meersman, Hear the Wind Blow,
supra note 60, at 1A (stating that wind is unlikely to replace coal and nuclear
power because "it doesn't blow all the time ....
and when it does, its speed
varies"); Wind Power;Buffalo Ridge an Exciting Beginning, STAR TR. (Minneapolis), June 2, 1994, at 18A ("Future struggles to harvest the wind as other
than a marginal power source will have to deal with that huge weakness: The
wind blows only intermittenly, and unpredictably."). But see Brower, supra
note 13, at 5 (noting that the development of advanced energy storage technologies could conquer the limitations resulting from solar and wind power's variability); Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 5, at 22 (stating that renewables already
supply about 20% of the world's power and could supply 50% to 70% of current
domestic energy use by the year 2030); Meersman, Hear the Wind Blow, supra
note 60, at 1A ("Wind has daily and seasonal patterns that utilities can learn
and plan around.").
91. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
92. Id.
93. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (recognizing
that "in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of
power in the states to make laws governing matters of local concern").
94. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1976); see
City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (stating that the boundaries that the Commerce Clause imposes on state action "appear nowhere in the
words of the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of
this Court giving effect to its basic purpose"); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) ("Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is
that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation .... ").
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permit states, through protective legislation, to insulate their
businesses or their consumers from out-of-state competition. 95
Courts have fashioned two tests for evaluating claimed dormant Commerce Clause violations. Under City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey,9 6 a court must initially determine whether the
state regulation is "basically a protectionist measure" or
whether it "can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate
local concerns," with only incidental effects upon interstate commerce. 9 7 In making this determination, the court looks at both
the intent and the practical effect of the legislation.9 8 If the
court classifies a statute as embodying mere economic protectionism against interstate commerce, it will apply strict scrutiny.99 The court will invalidate the statute unless the state can
both justify its discrimination with a "factor unrelated to economic protectionism" and prove that no other nondiscriminatory
alternatives can adequately serve the state's interest. 0 0 If the
state cannot meet this burden, the court will strike down the
regulation regardless of the extent of the discrimination or the
number of parties affected. 1 °1
Conversely, where the statute does not discriminate and
promotes legitimate local concerns, the court will apply the balancing test described in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.10 2 to balance
95. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York, 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986).
96. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
97. Id. at 624.
98. Id. at 626 (stating that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as ends"). The Court evaluates a statute's practical effect in
terms of how it may interract with other state's regulatory schemes and
whether conflict would result if every state enacted such legislation. Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989) (stating that the Commerce Clause generally "protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of
one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State").
99. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
100. See, e.g., id. at 338 (holding that Oklahoma statute forbidding transportation of minnow for sale outside the state violated the Commerce Clause
where nondiscriminatory alternatives could better fulfill the state's legitimate
purpose of preserving wildlife); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
353 (1951) (holding that Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance prohibiting the sale of
milk within the city unless pasteurized within five miles of city limits placed an
undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause).
101. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988) ("[W]here discrimination is patent.., neither a widespread advantage to in-state interests
nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be shown.").
102. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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the competing claims of state and national power.10 3 The court
will uphold the statute "unless the burden imposed on... commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."'0

4

The court considers whether other means could serve

the legitimate purpose without placing a similar burden on interstate commerce.' 0 5 When a law is facially neutral, causing
business to shift from an out-of-state industry to an in-state industry neither renders the law discriminatory, 0 6 nor renders its
07
effects unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.'
Beyond the two tests, courts will summarily invalidate statutes that directly regulate interstate commerce, regardless of
the legislature's purpose.' 0 8 Thus, a state statute that attempts
to control transactions "that take[ ]place wholly outside the
state's borders" has "sweeping extraterritorial effect[s]" that violate the Commerce Clause.' 0 9 Similarly, a statute cannot "project its legislation" into other states by insisting "that producers
or consumers in other States surrender whatever competitive
advantages they may possess." 1 0
103. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (stating
that, where Congress has not acted under the Commerce Clause, the Court becomes the "final arbiter" of state and federal interests).
104. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (citing Pike, 397
U.S. at 142); see, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 128-29
(1978) (holding that a Maryland statute that prohibited producers or refiners of
petroleum products from operating any retail service stations within Maryland
did not violate the Commerce Clause).
105. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 624.
106. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981). See
supra note 104 (discussing Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 127-28).
107. In CloverLeaf Creamery, the Court held that the milk container statute
"regulate[d] evenhandedly" because it did not discriminate between in-state
and out-of-state milk, milk containers, or milk sellers. 449 U.S. at 471-72. The
Court then found that causing business to shift from out-of-state plastic resin
producers to in-state pulpwood producers did not clearly outweigh the statute's
legitimate environmental purposes. Id. at 473. The Court held that "a nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes is not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state
industry to a predominantly in-state industry." Id. at 474.
108. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality opinion).
109. Id at 642-43 (holding that statute requiring tender offerors for the
takeover of Illinios companies to register their offers in Illinois unconstitutionally barred interstate transactions between out-of-state offerors and out-ofstate shareholders of Illinios companies).
110. Brown Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York, 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986)
(holding unconstitutional a New York ordinance prohibiting liquor distillers
and producers from selling to New York wholesalers at a price higher than they
would charge in any other state).
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REGULATON PROMOTIG ENvmoN~mNTAL GoALs

States will often use economic legislation to accomplish environmental goals. Such legislation will often interfere with interstate commerce, implicating the Commerce Clause. A facially
neutral economic regulation that is nondiscriminatory in both
intent and effect is likely to survive a Commerce Clause challenge under the balancing test, because the court will defer to
legitimate environmental goals.31 l, In contrast, a court will usually strike down regulations that are facially discriminatory or
economically protectionist, because their environmental justifications will rarely be sufficient to pass strict scrutiny. Thus,
the Supreme Court has invalidated a set-aside for in-state
coal. 112 The Court has also invalidated a string of economically

protectionist state laws impeding the importation of out-of-state
waste under the strict scrutiny test, disregarding alleged environmental justifications for the discrimination. 113 Statutes,
111. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 474 (1981). In Clover Leaf
Creamery, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute that banned plastic
nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk containers but allowed paperboard
nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk cartons. Id. at 473. The court held that the
statute's burden on interstate commerce was minor in light of the state's substantial interest in promoting energy and resource conservation, and easing
solid waste disposal problems. Id.
112. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992). In Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, an Oklahoma statute requiring in-state coal plants to burn a mixture containing 10% in-state coal failed strict scrutiny because it discriminated
against Wyoming coal "based solely on its origin." Id. The Court rejected
Oklahoma's argument that its discrimination was justified because it lessened
the state's reliance on Wyoming's coal and because its regulation would conserve Wyoming's cleaner coal for future use. Id. at 801-02. The Court held that
a state may not isolate itself from the national economy even to effectuate a
legitimate goal. Id. at 801. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit struck down an Illinois statute that required utilities to install "scrubbers" so they could burn dirtier in-state coal, because the statute operated like a discriminatory tax to
neutralize the price advantage of cleaner out-of-state coal. Alliance for Clean
Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2212 (1994)).
113. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (striking
down New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of waste generated or collected out-of-state). In City of Philadelphia,the Court held that whether New
Jersey intended its statute to reduce waste disposal costs or prevent pollution,
it unconstitutionally discriminated against out-of-state articles of commerce
without justification. Id. at 626-27. New Jersey could have achieved these
aims by "slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills," even
though this would have placed an incidental burden on interstate commerce.
Id. at 626; see also Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality,
114 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 (1994) (holding that Oregon surcharge on in-state disposal of out-of-state solid waste based on the disposal cost borne by the state or its
political subdivisions violated the Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Mgmt.,
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however, have passed strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court upheld a Maine statute's ban on the importation of baitfish under
strict scrutiny, valuing the protection of "imperfectly understood
environmental risks" over free trade.' 1 4
A recent Supreme Court decision regarding solid waste regulation has set the tone for state efforts to control the out-ofstate environment. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown," 5 the Court held unconstitutional a local ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste within the town to be
sorted by a transfer station designated by the town, a practice
known as "flow control" or "designation.""36 Clarkstown's decision to build the transfer station rather than patronize landfills
was environmentally-motivated because landfills cause environmental damage, 1 7 and the flow control law ensured the transfer
station enough business to secure its financial viability. 1 18 The
Court found that the flow control ordinance was an economic
regulation that facially discriminated against out-of-state waste
processors and that it failed strict scrutiny. 1 9 The Court rejected Clarkstown's environmental arguments for flow control,
reasoning that Clarkstown could institute nondiscriminatory
safety regulations instead. 120 It held that Clarkstown could not
steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that harm
Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2017 (1992) (invalidating Alabama statute which
imposed an additional fee per ton for the in-state disposal of hazardous waste
generated out of state); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Nat. Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2028 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a Michigan statute prohibiting persons from disposing of solid waste generated outside
the county in which the disposal facility was located unless specifically authorized to do so in the county's solid waste management plan).
114. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148, 151-52 (1986) (holding that the
Commerce Clause "does not elevate free trade above all other values," and that
if the state does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or place itself in economic isolation, it has broad authority to regulate for citizens' health and
safety).
115. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
116. Id. at 1684.
117. Clarkstown contracted for the construction of the transfer station in
accordance with a promise to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation that it would close its landfill, clean up the environmental
damage, and make new arrangements for the town's waste disposal. Id. at
1693 (Souter, J., dissenting).
118. Clarkstown's transfer station could not compete with other facilities in
the open market because sorting waste at a transfer station rather than taking
it to a landfill required charging waste generators a higher fee. Id. at 1680.
119. Id. at 1684.
120. Id. at 1683.
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the environment because this would "extend the town's police
power beyond its jurisdictional bounds." 12 1
I. ANALYSIS OF MINNESOTA'S QUANTIFICATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
When Minnesota set its interim externality values, a multistate coal association, Western Fuels, challenged the action on
Commerce Clause grounds. 12 2 The Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission rejected the challenge after concluding that the externality values were nondiscriminatory, evenhanded regulations that imposed only incidental regulations on interstate
commerce. 123
Following Carbone, decided two months after Western Fuels' challenge, the Commerce Clause issue that quantification
raises has become more complex. Carbone did not render incorrect the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission's determination
that Minnesota's quantification law is not discriminatory in intent or in practical effect. Nevertheless, under Carbone, a court
must invalidate the statute because it directly regulates commerce in other states. By amending the statute to quantify only
in-state harms from local and nonlocal plants, Minnesota could
successfully avoid any Commerce Clause problems.
A.

MNNESOTA'S QUANTIFICATION LAw Is NOT DIsCRnmNAToRY

Whether a state law impeding an article of commerce violates the Commerce Clause often hinges on its threshold classification as economic protectionism or as regulation of a matter of
legitimate local concern with incidental effects on interstate
commerce. 124 On its face, Minnesota's quantification law does
not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state plants. Unlike
the flow control ordinance in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
121. Id.
122. Re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 130, 134-35 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994).
123. Id. ("The interim values adopted here do not discriminate between instate and out-of-state generation. A ton of sulfur dioxide will be valued the
same regardless of its geographic origin.").
124. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), in which the Court formulated the
test that analyzed whether a state regulation was protectionist, or whether it
was directly related to legitimate concerns).
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Clarkstown,'125 requiring utilities to add externality values to
the price of all power plants does not identify geographical
boundaries and contain an article of commerce within those
boundaries. 126 Nor does Minnesota intend to discriminate
against out-of-state coal plants by quantifying environmental
externalities. 127 The externality values "simply grow out of
Minnesota's legitimate interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens and environment," by ensuring rational re8

source planning decisions.12

If a statute is not facially discriminatory, courts examine its
practical effect. No coal is mined in Minnesota, 12 9 and thus the
coal interests that Minnesota's quantification law burdens reside exclusively out-of-state. Combined with Minnesota's other
renewable energy preferences and mandates, 30 Minnesota's
quantification law could completely phase out future coal
projects to the benefit of in-state renewable resource
18
businesses.
125. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994); see supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text
(discussing Carbone).
126. The Carbone Court reasoned that the effects of the flow control ordinance were interstate in reach and that these effects-increasing the cost of instate disposal of out-of-state waste and dosing a local market to out-of-state
businesses-discriminated against an article of commerce based on its origin.
114 S. Ct. at 1682. Cf id. at 1688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (positing that
Clarkstown's flow control ordinance did not bestow "a competitive advantage to
local businesses as a group vis-a-vis their out-of-state or nonlocal competitors
as a group").
127. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota's rationale for quantifying externalities).
128. Re Quantification of Environmental Costs Pursuant to Laws of Minnesota 1993, CI. 356, § 3, No. E-999/CI-93-583, 1994 WL 614147, at *6 (Minn.
Pub. Util. Coim'n 1994).
129. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (describing sources of
Minnesota's energy).
130. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describing possibilities
for renewable resource growth in the Midwest).
131. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota's
renewable resource preferences and mandatory wind quotas). The renewable
resource preference laws prohibit the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
from approving a nonrenewable resource plant unless it "is less expensive (including environmental costs) than power generated by a renewable energy
source." MINN. STAT. § 216B.243(3)(a) (1994). Further, the Commission may
not approve a utility's proposal to build a nonrenewable plant as part of its
resource plan unless the utility demonstrates that "a renewable energy facility
is not in the public interest." See MmN. STAT. § 216B.2422(4). Mandatory wind
and biomass quotas will explicitly prevent coal plants from competing for certain utilities contracts. See MmN. STAT. §§ 216B.2423, .2424 (Supp. 1995).
Quantifying environmental externalities may also ensure that in the year 2002
when NSP's wind mandates are subject to the resource planning process, wind
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Nevertheless, Minnesota's law is not discriminatory in practical effect. North Dakota and other Midwestern states also
have renewable resource businesses that stand to benefit from
Minnesota's renewable energy preferences. 13 2 Further, Minnesota's quantification statute differs from an in-state coal setaside because it evenhandedly boosts renewable resources in the
energy market. 13 3 Although North Dakota coal plants may suffer from Minnesota's law, "[t]he fact that the burden of a state
regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." 134 Quantifying environmental externalities will not
cause Minnesotan energy to constitute a larger share of the electricity market than out-of-state energy.' 3 5
B.

QUANTiFYING ExTERNAurms THAT SOLELY IMPACT THE

Our-OF-STATE ENVmoNmFNT Is

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Even though Minnesota's quantification law is not discriminatory and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny, a court should
hold it unconstitutional because it directly regulates out-of-state
commerce. Although Minnesota has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens' welfare, it has no legal interest in protecting
North Dakota residents. In C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, the Court made it clear that Clarkstown did not have the
jurisdictional police power to steer nonhazardous solid waste
away from out-of-state landfills that harm the out-of-state environment. 13 6 According to the Court, "[s]tates and localities may
power will be the "least-cost" choice. See MiNN. STAT. § 216B.2423 (Supp. 1995).
The fact that quantified values do not apply to Minnesota's existing power supply and therefore may only affect a small volume of future business will not
save the law if it discriminates against interstate commerce.
132. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that the most likely
spot for NSP's new wind farms is the Buffalo Ridge, a stretch of land that runs
through several Midwestern states); supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text
(describing study depicting the possibilities for renewable resources in the Midwest). See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing Commerce Clause
principle that an economically protectionist law is invalid regardless of the volume of business or number of parties affected).
133. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800-801 (1992), where the Court struck an in-state
coal set-aside).
134. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978).
135. Cf id. at 126 n.16 (noting that Maryland statute prohibiting producers
and refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations within
Maryland had no effect on Maryland's market share of goods sold).
136. 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994) (stating Clarkstown may not 'justify the
flow control ordinance as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town dis-
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not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control
commerce in other states." 13 7 Further, states may not project
their legislation into other states by requiring out-of-staters to
surrender their competitive advantages. 13 8 Such restrictions on
interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause regardless of
13 9
whether the law is facially neutral or facially discriminatory.
Similarly, Minnesota has no police power to deflect business
away from out-of-state coal plants that harm North Dakota's environment. Because Minnesota has no environmental justification for quantifying externalities in North Dakota, the
regulation is purely economic. Quantifying North Dakota's environmental externalities attaches restrictions to North Dakota
coal power in order to directly control that state's commerce in
Minnesota. 140 Quantifying North Dakota's external costs
projects Minnesota's legislation into North Dakota and forces
North Dakota coal plants to surrender their competitive advantages. The practice is therefore unlawful.
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
EXTERNALITIES WITHOUT BURDENING
INTERSTATE COMMERCE

A. A SHORT-TERM PROPOSAL FOR QUANTIFYING EXTERNALITmS
wiTH LOcAL ImPACTS
Minnesota's strong interest in its environment should enable it to quantify the external costs that local plants generposal sites that it might deem harmful to the environment" because "Etlo do so
would extend the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds").
137. Id. at 1683.
138. Brown-Forman Distillers, Inc. v. New York, 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986).
139. Following Carbone,the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania applied
the Commerce Clause balancing test and held unconstitutional a local flow control ordinance that required haulers to deliver all waste within county limits to
any facility (in-state or out-of-state) designated by the county. Empire Sanitary
Landfill Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 645 A2d 413, 419 (Pa.
Comw. Ct. 1994). The court held that this waste-flow ordinance did not
overtly discriminate against interstate commerce because it did not specifically
state that the county-generated waste must only be disposed of at a county or
state facility. Id. The court found, however, that the ordinance violated the
Commerce Clause because its incidental effect on interstate commerce was to
preclude out-of-state transportation of waste. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). As in Carbone, the state could not justify this
undue burden as an environmental measure to prevent disposal at harmful outof-state sites because this would overextend the town's police power. Id.
140. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (discussing unconstitutionality of state laws that directly control out-of-state commerce).
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ate. 141 Quantifying in-state plants' pollution only solves part of
the problem, however, because Minnesota also has a legitimate
interest in reducing in-state pollution effects from out-of-state
plants. Pursuant to this interest, the Commerce Clause should
permit Minnesota to quantify external impacts on the Minnesota environment resulting from out-of-state power generation
and add these costs to the direct price of out-of-state power.
Traditional state environmental laws can only cover state polluters and therefore cannot reach pollutants that cross state borders. 142 Quantifying externalities would enable Minnesota to
reach these travelling pollutants only to the extent of their harm
14 3
on Minnesota's environment.
To immediately rectify Commerce Clause problems, therefore, the Minnesota Legislature should amend Minnesota's
quantification law" 4 to provide that:
The [Minnesota Public Utilities] [C]ommission shall, to the extent
practicable and in conjunction with state environmental regulators,
quantify and establish a range of in-state environmental costs associated with each method of electricity generation. A utility shall use the
values established by the commission in conjunction with other external factors, including socioeconomic costs, when evaluating and selecting resource options in all proceedings before the commission,
including resource plan and certificate of need proceedings. Nothing in
this section should preclude a utility from using a zero externalityvalue
if a particular facility would not cause any harm to Minnesota's
environment.

A feasible proposal, this law would authorize a joint effort
among the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and other
state environmental agencies to determine monetary values for
the in-state effects of the pollutants that power plants
produce
45
when they generate electricity for Minnesotans."
141. Quantifying in-state plants' externalities is similar to the cap on instate emissions in Minnesota's Acid Deposition Control Act. See supra notes
42-43 and accompanying text.
142. Critics described Minnesota's Acid Deposition Control Act as "toothless" because it only regulated in-state pollution sources and had no jurisdiction
over the out-of-state utilities that are responsible for 90% of the emissions causing acid rain in Minnesota. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota's jurisdictional problem with out of state emissions).
143. Travelling pollutants are particularly problematic in the context of unregulated pollutants like greenhouse gases, which allegedly cause global pollution. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota's choice
to set interim monetary values on emissions of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse
gas).
144. MINN. STAT. § 216B.2422(3)(a) (1994).
145. See infra notes 187-191 and accompanying text (explaining benefits of
integrated externality legislation). State governmental agencies that have a
broad, forward-looking perspective toward environmental regulation are best
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The Commerce Clause recognizes a "distinction between the
power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their
health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce" and "its lack of power to retard,
burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic
advantage." 4 6 The proposed law, quantifying externalities with
in-state harms, will allow Minnesota to shelter its people from
the health and safety problems that emanate from nonlocal
power plants, but would not restrict commerce for economic advantage. The proposed law is neither facially discriminatory nor
discriminatory in practical effect.' 47 Rather, it is facially neutral and regulates polluters evenhandedly in proportion to the
damage they cause Minnesota's environment. Nor does the proposed law directly regulate interstate commerce, because it does
not attempt to "project its legislation" into North Dakota in order to control North Dakota's commerce.' 48 Instead, its goal is
to protect Minnesota's environment.
A statute that is neither discriminatory nor economically
protectionist, and that it does not directly regulate commerce,
still must survive Commerce Clause balancing test under Pike v.
suited for determining Minnesota's externality values. For example, while a
utility's goal is to provide electricity service to a narrow regional client base, the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency's "clients" include statewide Minnesota
residents as well as future generations of Minnesotans. Thus, the agency has
greater incentive than a utility to assign externality values that will promote a
clean and healthy environment. See Re Quantification of Environmental Costs
Pursuant to Laws of Minnesota 1993, Ch. 356, § 3, No. E-999/CI-93-583, 1994
WL 614147 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994) (testimony of Robert J. McCarron,
Minnestota Pollution Control Agency, Air Quality Division).
The proposed law favors damage cost estimates focusing on in-state environmental damage. Damage-based valuations for in-state pollution harms is
possible through the use of "benefit transfer" techniques. Benefit transfer techniques would allow public utility regulators to transfer the results of analyses
of environmental costs in one region to another region based on a quantitative
description of the significant relationships between the two regions. Id. For
example, if the sulfur dioxide emissions from a Minnesotan coal plant affecting
ten thousand Minnesotans caused $100,000 of in-state environmental health
damage, benefit transfer analyses would demonstrate that a North Dakotan
coal plant affecting only one thousand Minnesotans would cause only $10,000 of
in-state environmental costs.
146. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205,2218 n.21 (1994) (citing
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949)).
147. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (describing treatment of
facially discriminatory state laws under the Commerce Clause).
148. See supra part IU.B (explaining that quantifying out-of-state pollution
harms violates the Commerce Clause because it directly regulates commerce to
eradicate out-of-state plants' price advantage).
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Bruce Church.'49 This test requires court's to weigh the state's
legitimate local interests against the statute's burden on interstate trade. 50 Minnesota's interests include reducing in-state
electricity externalities, boosting renewable resources, ensuring
rational utility planning, and anticipating future environmental
regulations. 15 1 These interests clearly outweigh the burdens of
Minnesota's quantification of local externalities, which fall on
interstate trade only to the extent that such quantification prevents dirtier fossil fuel plants from supplying new in-state
power if their pollutants damage Minnesota. 52 This damage
could be minimal, or even zero.- 53
Quantifying only externalities with local harms does not
mean that out-of-state fossil fuel plants will always win in-state
energy contracts. In conjunction with Minnesota's other statutes, the proposed law effectuates Minnesota's environmental
goals, such as providing a competitive boost to both in-state and
out-of-state renewable energy sources.' 5 4 Minnesota's renewable preference laws will ensure that renewable energy will comprise a large portion of Minnesota's new energy market because
they forbid building or refurbishing nonrenewable plants unless
they are in the public interest. 155 Similarly, Minnesota's wind
and biomass mandates will secure renewables a prominent position in Minnesota's energy future.' 56 Utilities will make rea149. 397 u.s. 137 (1970).
150. Id. at 142; see supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text (describing
Commerce Clause balancing test). The line between a statute that discriminates because of its practical effects and one which is facially neutral but places
an undue burden on interstate commerce is a blurry one. See supra note 139
(discussing Pennsylvania case in which the court used the Commerce Clause
balancing test to invalidate a flow control ordinance that it deemed discriminatory in practical effect).
151. See supra notes 5, 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota's interests in quantifying environmental externalities).
152. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (describing existing law,
which prevents dirtier fossil fuel plants from supplying new in-state power regardless of whether their pollutants damage Minnesota).
153. See supra note 45 (noting that damage from acid rain in Minnesota has
thus far been minimal despite violations of the Acid Rain Deposition Act).
154. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota's
interest in promoting the development of renewable resource energy).
155. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing renewable
preference laws).
156. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing renewable resource mandate laws). Renewable resource mandates would also protect Minnesota ratepayers from having to absorb unjustified financial risks from
regional utilties' overinvestment in out-of-state fossil fuel plants to circumvent
Minnesota's externality policies. For example, renewable resource mandates
would prevent a regional utility such as NSP from extensively investing in
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soned resource planning decisions' 57 because energy sources
that are "cleaner" to Minnesota will underbid dirtier ones. This
scheme does not unduly burden interstate commerce because,
even if no out-of-staters could compete with Minnesotan renewables, a facially neutral law's burden is not clearly undue merely
because it causes some business to shift from a predominantly
out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state industry.'5 8
Finally, the proposed law will still enable Minnesota to prepare
for stricter federal emissions controls by accounting for externalities from residual pollution,' 5 9 or from currently unregulated
60
pollutants like greenhouse gases or mercury.'

B. A

LONG-TERM PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING RESEARCH
GRANTS AND MARKET-BASED REGULATION TO AccouNT
FOR ENVIRoNMENTAL EXTERNALITIES

Although quantifying local harms is a legal compromise
that satisfies the Commerce Clause, the desirability of the practice itself is an unsettled issue. Some commentators have severely criticized the quantification of environmental
externalities. 161 They claim that existing regulations sufficiently control air emissions and require industry to internalize
their environmental costs. 1 62

Externality values have also

North Dakota coal plants with the intent of selling power to Minnesota and
passing the costs of the new plants on to Minnesotans. NSP is already committed to using a certain amount of renewable resource energy. If, despite existing
renewable mandates, the Minnesota Legislature still believes that utilities plan
to rely too heavily on fossil fuel power, it could simply increase the mandates.
157. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission's belief that quantification of environmental externalities
engenders rational utility planning decisions).
158. See supra notes 107, 111 (discussing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981)).
159. Residual pollution includes emissions remaining after a utility has
complied with all federal and state enviromental laws. See Robert Smock, ExternalitiesJust Quantify Bias, ELECTRIC LIGHT & PowER, Mar. 1993, at 4.
160. See MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY MERCURY TASK FORCE,
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING MERCURY IN MINNESOTA 1-3 (1994) (discussing mercury contamination in Minnesota's lakes and advocating federal and state
measures to reduce nationwide mercury releases).
161. See, e.g., Trisko, supra note 13, at 52 ("[The monetization of externalities through so-called 'adders' to direct generation costs can lead to inefficient
resource allocation and expose consumers to electric rate incrases without corresponding environmental benefits.").
162. For an extensive discussion of federal environmental regulation of
power plants, see Black & Pierce, supra note 5, at 1389-98; see also Trisko,
supra note 13, at 52 ("Additional emission reductions are now increasingly expensive because most cost effective reductions already have been achieved
through the attainment of ambient air standards and other compliance meas-
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drawn criticism for their speculative nature. 163 In addition, because the resource planning process only accounts for future energy supply and demand, utilities will only add externality
values to new power generating plants; dirtier existing plants
remain unaffected. This casts doubt upon their effectiveness in
controlling pollution. 16 Finally, having to charge consumers
65
more for power places regulated utilities at a disadvantage.
Given the shortcomings of quantifying environmental externalities, a better system by which to address environmental externalities incorporates a mix of uniform federal regulations and
state-specific environmental choices. It guarantees utility investment in renewable resources without placing utilities in the
anticompetitive position of having to choose resource options
with a higher direct cost. To be lawful, it does not mandate that
states attach restrictions to imports in order to regulate the outof-state environment. 16 6 Finally, it applies to existing as well as

ures.... [Flurther reductions are achieved only at high cost and with few tangible air quality benefits."). For a complete explanation of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 and their regulatory effect, see Skirpan, supra note 26, at
191-204.
163. The Colorado Public Utilities Commission chose not to require monetized environmental externalities because "the evidence in the record indicates
that the methods for quantification of externalities are highly complex, and, at
this time, still speculative. ... Given this state of knowledge, it would be premature to mandate utilities to monetize externalities." Re Integrated Resource
Planning, 139 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 379, 383 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1992). See also ELCON: ExternalitiesQuestionMust Be Left To Congress,Not
Regulators, INDus. ENERGY BULL., Oct. 11, 1991, at 7, 28 (reporting Electricity
Consumers Resource Council's view that " ' [ these things defy quantification.
That's why they are externalities... . Such 'piecemeal' imposition of externalities would violate the principles of economic theory and sound public policy.");
Daniel Kaplan, Not All EmissionsAre CreatedEqual, ORNL ResearcherSays,
ENERGY DAILY, May 17, 1994 (arguing that states should not quantify greenhouse gases because "ecological impacts and global warming damages are
highly uncertain" and "nearly impossible to assess").
164. Brower et al., supra note 11, at 34.
165. See John Simpson, States Advised to 'Go Slow' on InternalizingExternalities,Pus. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15. 1993, at 36 (sumarizing reports by Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the DOE noting several problems
with quantification by states of environmental externalities); see also CEC Attorney Says Externalitiesand IRPHave Failed,UTn. ENvTL. REP., Aug. 5, 1994,
at 6 (statement of California Energy Commission assistant chief counsel that
air pollution values failed in California because "utilities resisted.... There is
no obvious reason why a utility should incur the extra costs of reducing environmental externalities if its competitors do not have the same obligation.").
166. See supra part I.B (discussing Commerce Clause restrictions on quantifying out-of-state externalities after Carbone).
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new energy
suppliers, and need not apply exclusively to air
16 7
emissions.
1. Research Grants
State and federal governments should expand the available
research grants that existing federal and state laws provide for
renewable energy research. 168 These grants are a key element
of a regulatory scheme for the energy industry because they enable renewable resource plants to develop technology that would
allow them to compete against fossil-fuel plants on their own,
without government intervention such as quantification. 6 9
Grants enable renewable energy companies to engage in 17the
0
costly, but necessary, research to improve their technology.
2. Economic Incentives
In conjunction with research grants, state and federal governments should use economic incentives to spur investment in
renewable resource plants. Minnesota already gives a property
tax exemption to renewable resource landowners. 171 State and
federal governments could also give investment tax credits, providing a tax offset to plant developers based on a percentage of
the cost they invest in capital equipment.' 7 2 They could also
award production tax credits, basing the tax offset on the
amount of energy the plant produces.' 73 The federal government, for example, has implemented investment tax credits for
167. See supra notes 161-162, 164 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms that quantification is underinclusive and ineffective at controlling air
pollution).
168. See supra notes 33, 35, 48 and accompanying text (discussing research
grants by the federal government and Minnesota Legislature).
169. For example, Bell Systems developed photovoltaic cells in a research
laboratory, and the U.S. space program funded its conversion into renewable
energy systems. STAMtS, supra note 6, at 770. Initially, photovoltaic cells were
too expensive for commercial use, but their manufacturing costs have decreased
tremendously due to research and development funding. Id. In the near future,
photovoltaics "are likely to be competitive with other generating technologies in
common use today." Id.
170. Such technology could solve some of the unique problems associated
with renewables. Id. For example, solar energy cannot be stored like fossil fuels, but must be "captured" when the resource is available. Id. Technology can
provide cost-effective storage by mechanical or electrical means. Id. Research
can provide methods of integrating solar energy with other energy resources,
such as solar/diesel hybrid systems, in utility plans. Id.
171. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
172. STAnRs, supra note 6, at 769-70.
173. Id.
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solar and geothermal energy,' 74 and has recently authorized
production tax credits for wind and biomass plants.' 7 5
3.

Market Based Pollution Control Methods

Supplementing grants and economic incentives with an integrated market-based approach toward environmental externalities would obviate the need for state quantification.' 7 6
Market-based treatment of environmental externalities seeks to
internalize environmental externalities at the lowest total
cost.' 77 In the electricity industry, a broad market-based
scheme could compel power plants to pay an amount equal to
the environmental costs of energy production, thereby internalizing such externalities.' 7 8 At the federal level, environmental
regulators are experimenting with market-based solutions in
the 1990 CAAA.' 7 9
Economists have proposed two market-based methods of internalizing externalities: emissions taxes and permit trading.' 8 0 In an emissions tax scheme, federal or state
174. The federal Energy Tax Act (ETA) established investment tax credits
for solar and geothermal energy. 26 U.S.C. § 48 (Supp. V 1993).
175. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1993).
176. The National Regulatory Research Institute recommends addressing
environmental externalities in this integrated scheme in PUC TREATMENT OF
ENviRONMErNTAL EXTERNALrrIES,

supra note 17, at 131-42.

177. Id. at 20.
178. Id. This produces an economically efficient result, but residual pollution may remain when reducing emissions by an additional ton costs less than
the social harm caused by the ton of emission. Id. at 20. The most efficient
regulatory approaches to environmental externalities will thus reduce emissions to a given level at minimum cost but will not eliminate all pollution. Id.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (Supp. V 1994); see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (introducing the Clean Air Act). Title IV of the CAAA establishes a
permit trading system for sulfur dioxide ("SO2") emissions. PUC TREATMENT OF
ENvIRoNmENTAL EXTERNALrrms, supra note 17, at 27. S02 is the pollutant leading to acid rain. The S02 Allowance Program is designed to reduce S02 emissions by ten million tons by the year 2000. Id. at 26-27. The Act proposes to
achieve the reduction in two phases. Phase I begins in 1995, when 110 selected
utilities must meet emission-allowance limits. Id. at 26. Phase II, which begins
in the year 2000 and applies to all U.S. electricity generating facilities, sets a
ceiling on total allowances distributed. Id. at 26-27. Electric utilities are given
annual allowances, based on their past fuel usage and emission levels, which
give them the right to emit one ton of S02 per allowance. Id. at 27. Utilities
may use the allowances during that year, "bank" them for use in future years,
or trade them to any other utility. Id. To date, utilities have traded $125 million in allowances. Id. If they emit more pollutants than they have allowances,
utilities receive fewer allowances during the next year, are forced to pay a
$2000-per-ton fine, and are subject to criminal prosecution. Id.
180. PUC TREATMENT OF ENviRONMENTAL EXTERNALimIs, supra note 17, at
14.
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environmental regulators set a dollar value per ton for specific
81
pollutants that represents that ton's environmental damage.'
Polluters will naturally find the most efficient point at which
their cost to reduce emissions by an additional ton equals the
emissions tax. 8 2 In a permit trading scheme, regulators set a
limit on the total number of emissions in an area and issue a
certain number of permits. 8 3 The market price of the permits
equals the damage cost of emissions. 8 4 Polluters may trade
the permits and will naturally buy them when the price is less
than their cost of reducing emissions and sell them when the
price is above their control cost.' 8 5 Crucial to the success of
either approach in internalizing environmental externalities,
the governmental regulator must set the tax at the right amount
or hand out the right number of permits.' 8 6 If either the tax is
too low or if too many permits are available, it will be cheaper to
pollute.
Market-based pollution control methods offer several benefits over other forms of environmental regulation. They recognize that private companies can determine their own least-cost
strategy of complying with environmental regulations, which
leads to more efficient results than inflexible regulatory controls. L8 7 In the electricity industry, for example, market-based
programs give public utilities, with the approval of public utilities commissions, complete autonomy over how to meet emissions standards. 8 8 In addition, market-based programs are
181. Id.

182. Id. While similar in concept to environmental externality adders, pollution taxes (1) would be set by environmental regulators rather than state
PUCs and therefore could govern all pollution sources and not solely public utilities; (2) would be based on estimates of enviornmental damage rather than
estimates of the cost to control pollution; (3) would apply to both existing and
new resources; and (4) would actually tax the pollution source rather than having utilities add a theoretical externality value in the IRP process. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 119.
185. Id. at 14.
186. See id. at 15-16 (explaining in economic terms why an environmental
regulator's inaccuracies can lead to inefficient results); id. at 119 (discussing
the effects of government issuance of too few or too many permits).
187. Skirpan, supra note 26, at 185-86; PUC TREATmENT OF ENVIRONMENTA. EXTERNALTIES,

supra note 17, at 22 ("Environmental regulators simply are

not in a position to know what mix of control measures and facility-specific
emission rates represent the most cost-effective portfolio of control measures or

how that mix should change over time.").
188. Utilities may avail themselves of demand-side management programs
(conserving electricity), unit commitment and dispatch decisions (manipulating
which plants supply power at which times and how much power each plant

1582

52MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1547

potentially more effective at reducing pollution than other methods of environmental regulation.' 8 9 Rather than only governing
public utilities, they can cover all polluters. 190 Market-based solutions, in sum, give polluters incentives to develop new technologies, rely on nonpolluting resources, and reduce emissions
below legal limits to sell allowances or avoid taxes. 19 1
Successful expansion of market-based approaches to cover a
broad range of environmental externalities requires a combined
effort among federal and state environmental regulators, state
energy and natural resource agencies, legislators, and public
utilities commissions.' 92 A coordinated approach promotes national uniformity, 193 yet permits tailoring environmental programs to individual states' needs.' 9 4 Thus, the federal
government should identify externalities that are of national
concern, determine their social harm, and establish emissions
taxes and trading systems. 19 5 The federal government should
should produce), power purchases (competitive contracting), and greater transportation and distribution efficiency, as well as new control technology, for reducing pollution. PUC TREATMENT OF ENVIRoNmENTAL EXTERNALIES_, supra
note 17, at 27-28. Command-and-control regulations, conversely, are inefficient
because they force companies to implement a certain technology regardless of
whether the same emissions reduction could be achieved with less cost. Id. at
118 (stating that, unlike command-and-control regulations, the result of emissions taxes and trading is theoretically efficient because "the benefits of all options for reducing emissions, including [demand-side management conservation
programs] and dispatch, are recognized").
189. See id. at 131. Methods such as state quantification that cover just new
investments "can only have a marginal impact on existing environmental damage," but market-based solutions reach all points in the generation cycle. Id.
190. By subjecting nonutilities and utilities alike to the same environmental
regulations, industry-wide pollution taxes and emissions trading eliminate incentives to create independent power companies outside the state PUC's
jurisdiction.
191. PUC TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ExTERNALrriEs, supra note 17, at
131.
192. Id.
193. See Panelists: Externalities Would Set Level Playing Field in Energy
Market, UTm. ENVTL. REP., Sept. 30, 1994, at 4 (quoting Gulf Coast Cogeneration Conference panelist's statement: "' Warket-based solutions are certainly
preferable. If we decide to control C02, we need to do it at the national level
instead of having 50 state commissions do it, which would fatally handicap that
market.' ").
194. Id. (quoting panelist's urge for a coordinated state and federal initiative
where states are consulted to "'determine which externalities have already
been internalized' ").

195.

PUC TRIATMENT OF ENViRoNmF NrAL EXTERNALITIES,

supra note 17, at

134 (stating that some pollutants, such as C0 2 and S0 2, require national regulation "to prevent any one state from imposing environmental costs on others
and also to distribute the costs of emission reductions fairly across states").
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then authorize state environmental regulators to analyze local
environmental externalities not covered by federal legislation
and set reduction goals that may translate into state or regional
taxes and trading programs. 1 9 6 State PUCs should occupy a
third position based on their power over utilities, which are
often large polluters. State public utilities commissions have
the knowledge and experience to analyze different options for reducing emissions and to enact policies that will influence utilities. 197 Their role should therefore involve shaping regulatory
and ratemaking policies around the goal of helping utilities take
advantage of emissions taxes and trading programs to minimize
98
their compliance costs.'
The integrated system will avoid Commerce Clause
problems. Federal market-based schemes will cover environmental externalities of national concern pursuant to federal
Commerce Clause power. State market-based environmental
regulations will not violate the Commerce Clause because they
will govern only in-state pollution sources, which produce environmental damage of local concern.' 9 9 Finally, state PUC policies will not violate the Commerce Clause because they will
merely aid utilities in satisfying pre-existing state and federal
mandates.
CONCLUSION
Government needs to regulate the unaccounted-for environmental costs engendered by producing electricity, or society will
continue to bear these costs. The present system of regulating
these costs, state quantification of environmental externalities,
involves assigning a financial value to certain air pollutants and
requiring public utilities to add these values to the cost of buying power from a particular plant. This practice leads utilities
to invest in cleaner resources rather than cheaper, but dirtier,
fuels. Unfortunately, states violate the Commerce Clause when
they apply these values to extraterritorial harms because a state
has no police power to regulate the out-of-state environment.
196. The federal government can always authorize states to take actions
that may interfere with interstate commerce.
197.

PUC TRmF

nsETT
r OF ENvmRomrENTAL Ex'RNALmrIs, supra note 17, at

133-34.
198. Id. at 135.
199. See supra part II.B (explaining that a state has no interest in regulating the out-of-state environment).
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Quantifying only the in-state effects of electricity generation
is a viable solution to Commerce Clause problems, but will not
remedy quantification's underlying problems of underinclusiveness and market distortion. This Note therefore proposes continued subsidization of renewable resources through research
grants and economic incentives to help them compete in the energy market. This Note also proposes creating an integrated
scheme of federal and state market-based regulation, supported
by state utility commission policy, to assess environmental externalities and cause polluters to internalize them. Both proposals will produce economically and environmentally efficient
regulation yet remain compatible with the Commerce Clause.

